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NOTES
award of compensation to a garage porter who was injured by the
firing of a child's air rifle, on the ground that "he was injured be-
cause he was in the garage engaged in the duty assigned to him under
his contract of employment." 89 But in a later decision, the court ex-
pressly rejected the argument that an injury by accident may be
found to have arisen out of employment from the mere fact that the
employee would not have been in a position to receive the injury but
for the duties of his employment, expressing approval of the statement
that beyond this "it must appear that... [the accident] resulted from
something he was doing in the course of his work or from some
peculiar danger to which the work exposed him."' 9 The court has
distinguished an assault by an insane ex-fellow employee occurring
on the employer's premises and an assault by an insane stranger occur-
ring in a restaurant, finding that causal connection between the as-




USE OF SURVIVORSHIP CLAUSES IN WILLS
Today a draftsman of wills should consider the increased risks of
multiple deaths resulting from the hazards of modern living in gen-
eral and travel by airplane and automobile in particular. He should
be aware of the possibility of the client's death with his intended
beneficiary within a short period, in a common disaster, or under cir-
cumstances in which there is no evidence of survivorship. The failure
to provide for these possibilities may lead to the frustration of a
testamentary disposition, as a beneficiary must survive the testator in
order to take under the testator's will.' Further, the advent of the
marital deduction provisions in the Internal Revenue Code2 makes
a consideration of these possibilities a practical sine qua non to the
drafting of any testamentary plan involving a husband and wife.
These possibilities will herein be considered from the standpoint of
the common law, applicable statutes and testamentary provisions.
89. Carmichael v. Mahan Motor Co., 157 Tenn. 613 (1928).
90. Scott v. Shinn, 171 Tenn. 478, 483 (1937).
91. Whaley v. Patent Button Co., 184 Tenn. 700 (1947); Thornton v. R.C.A.
Service, 188 Tenn. 644 (1949).
1. Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289, 92 N.E. 429 (1910); Matter of Lott, 65
Misc. 422, 121 N.Y. Supp. 1102 (Surr. Ct. 1909). See the effect of a lapsed
legacy statute in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. White, 189 Md. 571,
56 A.2d 824 (1948). But cf. Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448,
451 (1925).
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2056.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Special attention is directed to the estate tax consequences resulting
from the use of survivorship clauses and to some of the advantages
and disadvantages of each type.
I. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Common Law
In the absence of statutory and testamentary provisions, there is
no presumption as to survivorship where two or more persons die
under circumstances in which it cannot be determined which one
survived.3 Rather, it is incumbent upon the party asserting survivor-
ship to show it by a fair preponderance of the evidence 4 sufficient to
satisfy reasonable minds.5 Therefore, where a testator and his legatee
perish under such circumstances, the legacy is distributed as though
the testator and the legatee perished at the same instant of time.6
Thus, as the legatee was incapable of taking, his heirs are deprived
of the legacy.7 Similarly, if two successive beneficiaries perish under
such circumstances, the testator's heirs will inherit a reversion since
neither beneficiary could be shown to have survived long enough to
inherit.8 Thus, the practical effect of the common-law rule is that
3. Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448 (1925); Middeke v.
Baeder, 198 Ill. 590, 64 N.E. 1002, 59 L.R.A. 653 (1902); In re Strong's Will, 171
Misc. 445, 12 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Surr. Ct. 1939); Will of Abram Ehle, 73 Wis. 445,
41 N.W. 627 (1889); Wing v. Angrave, 8 H.L. Cas. 183, 11 Eng. Rep. 397, 8 Eng.
Rul. Cas. 519 (1860). Contra, Colvin v. Procurator General, 1 Hagg. Ec. Rep.
92, 162 Eng. Rep. 518 (1827). See Notes, 43 A.L.R. 1348 (1926); 5 A.L.R. 797
(1920); 25 C.J.S., Death § 11 (1941); 9 WIGmoRE, EViDENCE § 2532 (3d ed. 1940).
The Roman and Civil law provided for such a presumption. See Wing v.
Angrave supra at 403; In re Herrmann, 75 Misc. 599, 136 N.Y. Supp. 944 (Surr.
Ct. 1912).
4. In re Hayward's Will, 143 Misc. 401, 256 N.Y. Supp. 607 (Surr. Ct. 1932),
aff'd 237 App. Div. 823, 260 N.Y. Supp 995 (1932). See Notes, 18 A.L.R. 105
(1922); 5 A.L.R. 797 (1920).
5. Clarke v. Bryson, 136 Cal. App. 521, 29 P.2d 275 (1934); Sporrer v. Ady,
150 Md. 60, 132 Atl. 376 (1926); In re Kimmey's Estate, 326 Pa. 33, 191 Atl.
47 (1937); cf. In re Wallace's Estate, 64 Cal. App. 107, 220 Pac. 682 (1923).
6. In re Strong's Will, 171 Misc. 445, 12 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Surr. Ct, 1939); St.
John v. Andrews Inst. for Girls, 117 App. Div. 698, 102 N.Y. Supp. 808 (1907),
modified, 191 N.Y. 254, 83 N.E. 981 (1908). Some courts recognize a presump-
tion of simultaneous and instant death here. See Kansas Pacific Ry. v. Miller,
2 Colo. 442, 464 (1874); Middeke v. Baeder, 198 Ill. 590, 64 N.E. 1002 (1902).
Others merely reach this holding and do not raise it to the dignity of a
presumption. Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U.S. 401 (1903);
Russell v. Hallett, 23 Kan. 194 (1880); In re Strong's Will, 171 Misc. 445, 12
N.Y.S.2d 544 (Surr. Ct. 1939). Distinction made in Note, 43 A.L.R. 1348
(1926). But cf. In re Lindop [1942] Ch. 377.
7. In re Burza's Estate, 151 Misc. 577, 272 N.Y. Supp. 248 (Surr. Ct. 1934);
In re Herrmann, 75 Misc. 599, 136 N.Y. Supp. 944 (Surr. Ct. 1912); In re Lott,
65 Misc. 422, 121 N.Y. Supp. 1102 (Surf. Ct. 1909). See Note, 43 A.L.R. 1348,
1349 (1926). Heirs of tenants by the entirety inherit such property in propor-
tion to the original contribution of the spouses. In re Strong's Will, 171
Misc. 445, 12 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Surr. Ct. 1939). But see McGhee v. Henry,
144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W. 509, 18 A.L.R. 103 (1921). See note 1 supra as to the
necessity of survivorship by a legatee.
8. Wing v. Angrave, 8 H.L. Cas. 183, 11 Eng. Rep. 397, 8 Eng. Rul. Cas. 519
(1860); cf. Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U.S. 401 (1903). See
9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2532 (3d ed. 1940).
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where the order of deaths cannot be established, a decedent's estate
is distributed as though he survived the beneficiary. 9
B. Statutes
The Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, in effect in 42 states, Hawaii
and Alaska,10 codifies the common-law rule into a presumption and
provides that where the order of death cannot be determined" the
property of each passes as if he had survived.'2 It also covers the
simultaneous death of successive beneficiaries, 3 joint tenants and
tenants by the entirety,14 and an insured and his beneficiary. 15 How-
ever, a lapsed-legacy statute, where applicable, may have the effect
of allowing a disposition to a beneficiary even though the testator is
presumed to have survived under the Simultaneous Death Act.
16
The anti-lapse statute requires that a gift to a pre-deceased legatee take
effect as though he were alive at the testator's death.'7 Thus, it is
important to provide for a substitute legatee to cover the possibility of
a beneficiary predeceasing the testator. 8
In addition to those states adopting the Uniform Act, Georgia 19
and Ohio20 have statutes making provision for the distribution of
9. See Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 488, 43 A.L.R. 1348
(1926). Compare the situation where a person is the sole heir of two persons
perishing simultaneously [Cooke v. Caswell, 81 Tex. 678, 17 S.W. 385 (1891)],
with the situation where a person is a remainderman of two persons perishing
simultaneously [Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. Cas. 183, 11 Eng. Rep. 397, 8 Eng.
Rul. Cas. 519 (1860) ]. But see Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187
U.S. 401 (1903). But cf. Fitzgerald v. Ayres, 179 S.W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915).
10. 9A U.L.A. 263 (1951).
11. The amount of proof required is the same as at common law. In re Di
Bella's Estate, 279 App. Div. 689, 107 N.Y.S.2d 929 (1951); In re Dukszta's
Estate, 193 Misc. 720, 87 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Surr. Ct. 1948). The act is inapplicable
if there is evidence as to which survived [Savers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 456, 218
P.2d 741 (1950)], or if the testator provides otherwise. UNIFoRM SnV1MTANEoUs
DEATH AcT § 6.
12. In re Gerasimoff's Estate, 96 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In re Dun-
ham's Will, 188 Misc. 1026, 69 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Surr. Ct. 1947).. But testator is
not prevented from providing by a survivorship clause that another is deemed
the survivor. In re Fowles' Will, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918). England
also provides a presumption that the younger of two persons survives where
they die under circumstances in which it cannot be shown which survived.
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 GEO. 5, c. 20 § 184.
13. UNIFORM SIM-ULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 2; cf. Miami Beach First National
Bank v. Miami Beach First National Bank, 52 So.2d 893 (Fla. 1951).
14. UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 3. But see Adams v. Gardener,
237 S.W. 2d 495 (Mo. App. 1951).
15. UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 4. McGowin v. Menken, 223 N.Y.
509, 119 N.E. 877 (1918).
16. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. White, 189 Md. 571, 56 A.2d
824 (1948). But cf. Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448, 451
(1925). See 5 Am. LAW OF PROP. § 22.49 (Casner ed. 1952).
17. In re Whelan's Will, 55 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Surr. Ct. 1945). Wallace v. Diehl,
202 N.Y. 156, 95 N.E. 646 (1911). See ATKInSON, WILLs 781 n.25 (2d ed. 1953).
18. In re Latz's Estate, 95 N.Y.S.2d 584 (Surr. Ct. 1950),; In re Greenwood,
[1912] 1 Ch. Div. 392.
19. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-906 (1937).
20. OHIO REV. CODE, tit. 21, § 2105.21 (1953).
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estates of persons who die under circumstances in which it cannot be
determined which one survived.
C. Survivorship Clauses
Survivorship clauses are designed to achieve particular objectives
and should be used only with a definite purpose in mind. These ob-
jectives usually include: avoiding double death taxes, 21 obviating suc-
cessive administration expenses, 22 averting litigation from uncertainty
as to the time of death,2 3 precluding an heir of a legatee in whom
testator has no interest from enjoying testator's wealth,24 preventing
exposure of property to possible creditors of a legatee's estate,25 se-
curing the marital deduction in all events, 26 and obtaining the marital
deduction only if the spouse is likely to outlive the testator by many
years.2
7
Normally a testator has two primary considerations, other than the
marital deduction, in mind when considering the possibility of death
with a beneficiary in a common disaster. He desires first to avoid
any dispute as to who survived, and second to avoid the consequences
of having his property pass through the estate of a beneficiary whose
death closely follows his own. To effectuate his desires the testator
may utilize one of the three following types of clauses:
1. Common Disaster Clause. "If any legatee and I die as a result of a
common disaster, the said legatee shall be deemed to have predeceased me
and this will and all its provisions shall be construed upon that assump-
tion and basis."28
2. Simultaneous Death Clause. "If any legatee or devisee die simul-
taneously with me or under such circumstances as to render it impossible
to determine who predeceased the other, I hereby declare that I shall
be deemed to have survived such legatee or devisee and this will and all
its provisions shall be construed upon that assumption and basis." 29
3. Time Clause. "For the purpose of this will a person shall not be
deemed to have survived me if such person dies within 90 days of my
death."
30
A common disaster clause contemplates death occuring to a testator
and his legatee from the same event. It does not contemplate death
21. See TRACHTmAN, ESTATE PLANNING, 62, 64 (5th ed. 1951). But see TWEED
AND PARSONS, LIFETIME AND TESTAMENTARY ESTATE PLANNING 44-45 (1951).
22. LASSER, ESTATE TAX HANDBOOK 477 (1951).
23. TRAcHTMAN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 58-60.
24. 9 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2532 (a) (3d ed. 1941).
25. TRACHTMAN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 60.
26. TRACHTMAN, op cit. supra note 21, at 62-63.
27. TWEED AND PARSONS, op cit. supra note 21, at 39.
28. See In re Davis' Estate, 186 Misc. 955, 61 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Surr. Ct. 1946),
ajFd mem., 211 App. Div. 970, 69 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't 1947). Evidence
that beneficiary actually survived the testator is not precluded. Modern
Woodmen of America v. Parido, 335 Ill. 239, 167 N.E. 52 (1929).
29. TWEED AND PARSONS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 92.
30. TRACHTMAN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 59. But see Kasper v. Kellar, 217
F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1954).
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from unrelated natural causes31 or death of a beneficiary being pre-
cipitated by news of the testator's death.3 2 Aside from the marital
deduction, this clause has the advantage of achieving a testator's ob-
jective only where a testator and his beneficiary die from injuries sus-
tained in the same accident. The disadvantages of this clause, which
seem to outweigh its advantages, include the following:
1. The use of the phrase "death in a common disaster" does not cover
the possibility of "death at or about the same time" and therefore, the
latter contingency is not provided for.
33
2. The clause may raise an issue as to whether an accident was the
cause of both deaths when the beneficiary lives on many years and then
expires. Was the accident the proximate cause of the death?
34
3. A beneficiary may not inherit from the testator by the terms of the
clause if his death, however long delayed, is the resultcof a common ac-
cident. Thus, in the situation in (2) above, titles to realty may be
left unsettled for years where the beneficiary lingers on.
35
The simultaneous death clause merely provides for a presumption of
testator's survival and has been given effect even where the beneficiary
predeceased the testator.36 This establishes a prima facie case for one
relying on testator's survivorship and having the burden of showing
survivorship.37 The clause does not cover deaths several months
apart 38 and in this respect differs from the common disaster clause.
3 9
But it does cover the instance of simultaneous deaths from unrelated
causes not covered by the common disaster clause. Such a clause may
cause trouble where a husband and wife make duplicate wills each
bequeathing his entire estate to the other, if surviving, and otherwise
$10,000 to a son. If both the husband and wife die simultaneously,
it would seem that by a proper construction of the clause the son
should receive only $10,000,4
0 but there is speculation to the contrary.
41
This clause, likewise has disadvantages:
31. In re Bull's Estate, 175 Misc. 197, 23 N.Y.S.2d 5 (Surr. Ct. 1940).
32. In re Davis' Estate, 186 Misc. 955, 61 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Surr. Ct. 1946), aff'd
mem., 211 App. Div. 970, 69 N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't 1947).
33. See Rogers v. Mosier, 121 Okla. 213, 245 Pac. 36 (1926). See TRAcHTmAN,
op. cit. supra note 21, at 58.
34. TRACHTMAN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 58. But cf. In re Davis' Estate, 186
Misc. 955, 61 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Surr. Ct. 1946), af'd mem., 211 App. Div. 970, 69
N.Y.S.2d 327 (1st Dep't 1947). Contra, Hackensack Trust Co. v. Hackensack
Hospital Ass'n, 120 N.J. Eq. 14, 183 Atl. 723 (1936).
35. TRACHTMAN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 58. But ci. In re Davis' Estate, 186
Misc. 955, 61 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
36. In re Fowles' Will, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).
37. Compare Wing v. Angrave, 8 H.L. Cas. 183, 11 Eng. Rep. 397 (1860),
with Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U.S. 401 (1903). See Note,
43 A.L.R. 1348, 1350 (1926).
38. Glover v. Reynolds, 135 N.J. Eq. 113, 37 A.2d 90 (Ch. 1944).
39. Rogers v. Mosier, 121 Okla. 213, 245 Pac. 36 (1926).
40. 2 ScHOULER, WILLs, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS § 1043 (6th ed. 1923);
cf. Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U.S. 401 (1903); Wing v.
Angrave, 8 H.L. Cas. 183, 11 Eng. Rep. 397 (1860).
41. TRACHTMAN, op cit. supra note 21, at 135.
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1. If the beneficiary survives only for a few moments, the testator's
property will pass through the legatee's estate resulting in the very
thing testator sought to avoid.
2. A new issue inviting litigation may be introduced, namely, whether
the circumstances were such as to render it difficult or impossible to de-
termine who died first.
Where the marital deduction is not a consideration, the time
clause will generally achieve the testator's objectives most satis-
factorily. Such a clause makes provisions for the contingencies not
provided for in the other two clauses and at the same time covers
simultaneous deaths from unrelated causes42 and almost all deaths in
a common accident. 43 The time clause has been varied by phrases such
as: "simultaneously, or approximately so";" "at the same time or
approximately at";45 and perish "in an accident or otherwise."46 But
in order to avoid any uncertainity, it is best to provide for a specified
time such as six months.
II. MARITAL DEDUCTION BEQUESTS
The most important use of survivorship clauses today is in con-
nection with the Federal Estate Tax marital deduction. In order to
obtain the deduction the beneficiary spouse must survive the testator.
47
Therefore, no reliance can be placed on the common law, the simul-
taneous death statutes or the survivorship clauses noted above, as they
each seek to resolve the doubt in favor of the testator's survival. If,
then, the testator wants it presumed that he died first he must so
indicate by a clause such as the following:
"If my wife and I die under such circumstances that it cannot be de-
termined who died first, it shall be presumed that she survived me and
this will and all its provisions shall be construed on that assumption and
and basis."148
The Internal Revenue Code makes it clear that a clause in a will
providing for a presumption of survivorship will be recognized if
state law will allow property to pass thereby. But if the testator in-
42. Could a time clause provide for a delay of 10, 20 or 30 years? The only
limitation seems to be one of reasonableness. See 2 PAGE, WILLs § 912 (3d ed.
1941).
43. Thus, a 90-day time clause would not provide for the situation where a
death occurred one year after an injury received in a common disaster.
44. American Trust & Deposit Co. v. Eckhardt, 331 Ill. 261, 162 N.E. 843
(1928).
45. In Te Searn's Estate, 29 Wash. 2d 230, 186 P.2d 913 (1947); cf. In re
Rentall's Will, 60 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Surr. Ct. 1945); Ross v. Clore, 74 N.E.2d 920
(Ind. App. 1947).
46. Matter of Johnston, 186 MVisc. 540, 64 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
47. 26 CODE FED. REGS. § 81.47a(a) (2) (i) (Cum. Supp. 1954).
48. See TWEED AND PARSONS, OP. cit. supra note 21, at 128; LASSER, op Cit.
supra note 22 at 479. But see TRAcHTMAN, op. cit. supra note 21, at 64. Such a
clause might be used to provide for the marital deduction and another time




disputably survives his spouse, such a presumption will not be rec-
ognized for marital deduction purposes.49 Thus, the simultaneous death
clause would suffice here but neither the common disaster nor the
time clauses would.
The marital deduction clause is recommended when the testator
desires to obtain the maximum marital deduction even though his
spouse survives for only a few moments. 50 Such a case will arise
where one spouse owns most of the family wealth and the other has
only nominal assets. It has been suggested that the maximum estate
tax saving is secured when "the husband gives his wife, instead
of the maximum marital deduction, only an amount equal to one-
half of the value of their combined estates less the value of her
estate, e.g. if the husband has $200,000 and the wife has $100,000 he
should give her $50,000."5 1
Where husband and wife both have substantial estates, the marital
deduction may be desired only if the testator is likely to be survived
by his spouse for a substantial period.5 2 Thus, where a husband has
an estate of $200,000 and his wife an estate of $150,000 there will be
a tax loss of $1100 if the husband uses the full marital deduction and
dies first.53 Nevertheless, in such circumstances there are certain ad-
vantages in taking the full marital deduction on the assumption that
the wife will survive for many years. First, the wife has the income
from the amount which otherwise would have gone to the govern-
ment in taxes. 54 Second, the wife can reduce her taxes by lifetime
gifts. Third, the necessity of sale of non-liquid assets at sacrifice prices
is avoided.
The Code provides that in order for an interest to qualify for the
marital deduction it must vest in the wife in such a manner as to be
includible in her estate. Therefore, no terminable interest such as a
life estate, term of years or shifting use in the wife would qualify.
However, an exception provides that a disposition to the wife, con-
tingent on her survival for six months or contingent on her death not
occurring as a result of a common disaster, will qualify.55 Thus, a time
clause providing for a suspension of the wife's interest for six months
would be advantageous where both husband and wife have sub-
stantial estates. To achieve such a result the following clause is recom-
mended:
49. 26 CODE FED. REGS. § 81.47a(a) (2) (i) (Cum. Supp. 1954). See LASSER, Op.
cit. supra note 22 at 477. But see In re Fowles' Will, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611
(1918).
50. TWEED AND PARSONS, op. cit. supra note 21 at 41-42, 127.
51. Id. at 39.
52. See TRACHTmA_, op. cit. supra note 21, at 62.
53. TWEED AND PARSONS, op. cit. supra note 21, at 38-39.
54. Note, however, that the wife will have to pay income tax on the income
received.




"For the purpose of this will my wife shall not be deemed to have
survived me if she dies within six months of the date of my death."
On testator's death title would vest in the executor subject to a spring-
ing use in the wife which would be executed by the Statute of Uses
and automatically vest on the wife's surviving the required six
months.56 If the wife failed to survive, the executor would hold in
a resulting trust for the heirs of the testator.
If a common disaster clause is used an interest will qualify for the
marital deduction unless either (1) the wife dies as a result of the
common disaster or, (2) upon the final audit of the decedent's estate
tax return it is possible that the beneficiary may die as a result of
the common disaster.57 Under the latter possibility it may be that
an interest will not qualify for the marital deduction and will be
taxed in both the decedent's and beneficiary's estates.58 However, the
dangers inherent in the use of the common disaster clause may be
obverted by use of a time clause limiting a spouse's right to take on
his survival for six months.5 9 Such a clause will also usually cover
the situation sought to be provided for by use of a common disaster
clause, since, if the wife survives for six months after being injured
in a common accident it is not likely that she will be found to have
died as a result of such accident.
CONCLUSION
The possibility of death in a common accident, or under circum-
stances in which it cannot be determined who survived, has increased
with the pace of modern living. Reliance on common-law rules and
simultaneous death statutes to provide for such situations is generally
unsatisfactory. Resort should be had to a survivorship clause to
achieve the proper disposition of testator's property, having in mind
the particular objective sought to be achieved. Apart from the marital
deduction, the time clause is generally recommended. Where the
marital deduction is desired in all events, the simultaneous death
clause is best. However, where the marital deduction is desired only
because the wife is likely to survive for a substantial time, the time
clause should be used.
HAROLD A. BOWRON, JR.
56. See 1 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS § 30 (1936); NOTE, 1 WASH. L. REV. 135
(1925).
57. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2056; 26 CODE FED. REGS. § 81.47b(d) (Cum. Supp.
1954).
58. The beneficiary spouse may have a deduction for previously taxed prop-
erty, however. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 2013.
59. The time clause must insure that the surviving spouse's interest will
definitely vest within the six-month period. See Kasper v. Kellar, 217 F.2d
744 (8th Cir. 1954).
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